

HYD 576

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION

HYDRAULIC MODEL STUDIES OF THE
BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
SALT RIVER PROJECT, ARIZONA


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OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER
DENVER, COLORADO

OCTOBER 2, 1967

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**HYDRAULIC MODEL STUDIES OF THE
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SALT RIVER PROJECT, ARIZONA**

by

G. L. Beichley

October 2, 1967

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ABSTRACT

Studies using a 1:100 scale model of Bartlett Dam spillway showed that erosion in the discharge channel was caused by impact of the spillway flow. Remedial work performed thus far has been beneficial, but additional paving protection and concrete fill should be installed along the left bank and at the base of the steep slope. These channel protection measures will prevent undermining the concrete-lined chute for all discharges up to the design flow of 175,000 cfs (4,952.5 cms). At flows of about 50,000 cfs (1,415 cms) or more, erosion is expected in the discharge channel remote from the concrete-lined chute. Excavation of protruding ridges to straighten the channel would do more harm than good. The studies proved that all 3 gates should be opened for best flow distribution at the flip bucket.

DESCRIPTORS-- *spillways/ dams/ jets/ slope protection/ *flood damage/ spillway gates/ hydraulic models/ hydraulic structures/ chutes/ pavements/ *erosion control/ *channel improvements/ flood protection/ erosion/ gate control

INVESTIGATORS-- Salt River Project, Ariz/ Arizona/ Bartlett Dam, Arizona

PURPOSE

The studies were conducted to determine corrective measures needed to prevent additional erosion damage in the discharge channel near the existing concrete-lined spillway chute.

RESULTS

1. The model confirmed that the erosion damage in the discharge channel was almost entirely due to the impact of the flow impinging on the badly fractured rock rather than to the churning of loose rock in the turbulent flow (Figure 9).
2. Repairs made after the 1965-66 floods appear to be well located for protection of the channel against further erosion, but the paving should be extended a little higher and farther downstream along the left bank (Figures 4, 9, and 11).
3. The deep erosion hole at the base of the steep slope should be filled with concrete (Figures 4, 7, and 11). This concrete fill should extend from the existing concrete on the upstream side of the hole to sound rock on the downstream side and should slope downward to the left in the direction of flow to flush loose rock from the channel.
4. At flows greater than about 50,000 cfs (1,415 cms) part of the jet will impinge in the downstream portion of the channel beyond the paved area (Figure 12); however, erosion damage will be sufficiently remote that the foundation of the spillway should not be endangered.
5. The spillway gates should be equally opened for best flow distribution at the flip bucket (Figure 8).
6. The two ridges partially blocking the downstream end of the channel should not be removed (Figure 13).
7. The upstream ridge and the existing weir in the left branch of the channel help form a shallow pool at the base of the paved slope for flows up to 50,000 cfs (1,415 cms) (Figure 14). This pool aids in absorbing some of the energy in the jet and in reducing erosion.

INTRODUCTION

Bartlett Dam is part of the Salt River Project near Phoenix, Arizona (Figure 1). The spillway in the right abutment is gate-controlled and discharges into a 170-foot-wide (51.82-meter-wide), concrete-lined chute. The chute is superelevated, curves to the left, and

terminates in a flip bucket. The design discharge capacity of the spillway is 175,000 cfs (4,952.5 cms).

Originally, flow from the flip bucket fell in an excavated channel leading to the river channel. The drop from the end of the excavated channel to the riverbed is about 100 feet (30.48 meters). The rock in this area is composed of two types of granite. One is a coarse-grained granite severely weathered to irregular depths.

This weathered rock is weak and easily eroded, but the underlying rock is hard and sound. The other type of granite is fine-grained, competent, and resistant to erosion. Three dominant systems of joints affect both rock types--two near-vertical systems and one irregularly developed horizontal system.

Floods in 1942 and 1965-66 severely eroded the excavated channel. Prior to the 1965-66 flood, the channel was repaired by placing mass concrete in retaining walls and blocks in the badly eroded portion of the channel near the downstream end of the chute (Figure 2). The 1965-66 spillway flows, estimated at 28,500 cfs (806.55 cms) from near-maximum reservoir elevation, washed out or undermined these concrete slabs and blocks in several areas (Figure 3). Erosion of the rock was quite rapid where the concrete had overlain the weak, weathered granite. At the base of the steep portion of the eroded channel, about 100 feet (30.48 meters) downstream from the concrete chute, one hole was eroded in the weathered rock to a depth of about 15 feet (4.57 meters).

Remedial work in the channel after the 1965-66 flood consisted of repairing damaged concrete blocks and protecting rock surfaces with formed or pneumatically placed concrete anchored to the rock (Figures 4 and 5). The hydraulic model studies described in this report were performed to determine channel improvement or additional protection necessary to prevent further erosion near the spillway chute and to determine the combination of operating gates that will provide the best flow distribution.

THE MODEL

The 1:100 scale model of the spillway (Figure 6) included the approach channel, crest, control gates and piers, superelevated concrete-lined chute, and the discharge channel from the chute downstream to the natural stream channel. The spillway and discharge channel were of concrete construction; the piers were formed in wood and the control gates were made of sheet metal. Two portions of the right bank near the downstream end of the discharge channel were made removable in anticipation that additional excavation in this area might improve prototype operation.

The discharge channel topography was initially constructed of three parts sand to one part pozzolan, 3/4-inch (1.9 cm) thick on wire mesh. This produced a firm but erodible topography which helped in evaluating the type and location of the severest erosion to be expected.

THE INVESTIGATION

The model was operated at discharges up to 50,000 cfs (1,415 cms) to determine flow conditions that might have caused the erosion. At discharges of 10,000, 20,000, and 50,000 cfs (283, 566, and 1,415 cms) flow from the spillway impinged on the areas that had been badly damaged in the prototype channel (Figure 8). The severest damage appeared to have occurred where the impact forces of the jet had apparently loosened and eroded the rock at the weathered joints. Initial tests made with the erodible channel indicated that the erosion began at the left downstream corner of the concrete-lined chute and progressed downstream as the discharge increased (Figure 9). This test confirmed the belief that the major portion of the erosion was due to flow impact rather than to rocks churning in the turbulent flow.

Gate Operation

Various combinations of operating gates were tested (Figure 10) to determine the combination that would provide optimum flow distribution in the chute. These tests showed that closing the right gate reduced the flow impingement on the right bank along the edge of the paved area and increased the impingement along the left bank. With the left gate closed, the reverse was true. These flow conditions were more pronounced when either the left or right gate was operated singly. The tests showed that all three gates should be opened equally for best flow distribution from the chute.

Channel Protection

Even with all three gates equally opened, portions of the flow impinged on the left and right sides of the discharge channel beyond the limits of the paved area. These areas of impingement are subject to erosion during future spillway discharges (Figures 4, 5, and 8). Erosion on the right side will occur far enough downstream that it is not likely to endanger the structure or undermine the paved area (Figure 5). Erosion may occur adjacent to the left concrete wall of the spillway chute and farther downstream along the left bank (Figure 4). The paving should be extended to prevent this erosion (Figures 9 and 11).

Spillway discharges have eroded a 15-foot (4.57-meter)-deep hole at the base of the steep slope in the prototype discharge channel.

(Figure 4). Further spillway operation possibly will increase the size of this hole and undermine the concrete paving on the steep slope. This hole should be filled with concrete extending from the existing concrete on the upstream side to the rock on the downstream side of the pool (Figures 7 and 11). Sloping this concrete fill downward from approximately elevation 1635 to elevation 1616 in the direction of flow along the existing channel (Figure 7) will flush loose rock downstream during spillway operation.

At flows of 100,000 (2,830) and 125,000 cfs (4,052.50 cms) (Figure 12) part of the jet impinged near the first ridge in the downstream portion of the discharge channel beyond the paved area. Discharges of these magnitudes will probably cause considerable erosion in the prototype channel remote from the spillway chute.

Channel Improvement

A high ridge of rock extends partly across the discharge channel about 100 feet (30.48 meters) downstream from the base of the steep slope; about 250 feet (76.20 meters) farther downstream, a second confining ridge protrudes into the channel. It was first thought that these ridges might be trapping loose rock in the channel and causing a "ball mill" type of erosion damage.

The two ridges were constructed in the model so that they could easily be removed and the channel could be tested with and without the ridges in place (Figure 13). Tests were run at discharges of 20,000 cfs (566 cms) and 50,000 cfs (1,415 cms) to determine the effect of removing either or both ridges. The tests showed that any loose rock that might fall into the channel will flush from the area, with or without the ridges in place.

Actually, the upstream ridge and the existing weir at approximately elevation 1640 in the left branch of the discharge channel (Figure 14) maintain a pool for flows up to 50,000 cfs (1,415 cms). This pool appeared to absorb part of the energy of the falling jet which would reduce the erosion damage (Figure 14); and, therefore should not be removed.

Figure 1
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



Figure 2
Report No. Hyd-576




BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
DISCHARGE CHANNEL EROSION AND REPAIRS
PRIOR TO THE 1965-66 FLOOD


Figure 3
Report No. Hyd-576



A. Note the undermining of previous channel repairs.



B. View looking towards right bank.



C. Note both vertical and horizontal joints in the weathered rock.

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
DISCHARGE CHANNEL EROSION
Caused by 1965-66 Flood

Figure 4
Report No. Hyd-576



Water stands in a 15-foot (4.57-meter)-deep hole eroded at the base of the steep slope. Areas subject to future erosion are indicated by the arrows.

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
Repairs to Discharge Channel Following
the 1965-66 Flood


Figure 5
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Areas subject to future erosion are indicated by
the arrows.

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
Repairs to the Discharge Channel Following
the 1965-66 Flood

Figure 6
Report No. Hyd-576




The extent of concrete paving placed
in discharge channel following the
1965-66 flood is painted white.

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
The 1:100 scale model



5002
3500
BARTLEY DAM
Sediment load on or near the
dam creates sedimentation areas
which may affect fish spawning and
habitat.


Figure 8
Report No. Hyd-576



A. 10,000 cfs (283 cms)



B. 20,000 cfs (566 cms)



C. 50,000 cfs (1,415 cms)

All flow through three gates equally open at Reservoir elevation 1803


The areas of flow impingement on the left and right banks beyond the white paved area are indicated by the arrows.

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
Flow in Discharge Channel
1:100 scale model

Figure 9
Report No. Hyd-576



A. 30,000 cfs (849 cms)



B. 175,000 cfs (4,952.5 cms)




C. Erosion resulting from flows of 30,000
and 175,000 cfs (849 and 4,952.5 cms)


Areas requiring additional concrete pro-
tection are indicated by the arrows.

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
Erosion Test
1:100 scale model

Figure 10
Report No. Hyd-576




A. Left gate closed



B. Right gate closed

14,000 cfs (396.2 cms) at reservoir elevation 1803



C. Left and center gates closed



D. Right and center gates closed

7,000 cfs (198.1 cms) at reservoir elevation 1803


The areas of flow impingement on the left and right banks beyond the white paved area are indicated by the arrows.

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
Flow with unsymmetrical gate operation
1:100 scale model

Figure 11
Report No. Hyd-576



A. Recommended additional concrete paving is indicated by the arrows



B. Recommended additional concrete fill is indicated by the arrow

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
Recommended Channel Protection
1:100 scale model

Figure 12
Report No. Hyd-576



A. 100,000 cfs (2,830 cms)



B. 175,000 cfs (4,952.5 cms)

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
Flow Conditions with Channel Protection

1:100 scale model

Figure 13
Report No. Hyd-576



P13-C-55156

- A. First and second ridges are removed to the elevation shown. Ridge locations are indicated by the arrows.




P13-C-55157


- B. First ridge only is removed.

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
Channel Alterations Tested
1:100 scale model

Figure 14
Report No. Hyd-576



A. Recommended concrete fill




B. Concrete fill with first ridge removed is not recommended

20,000 cfs (566 cms) at reservoir elevation 1803



C. Same as A



D. Same as B

50,000 cfs (1,415 cms) at reservoir elevation 1803

BARTLETT DAM SPILLWAY
Flow conditions with and without First Ridge

1:100 scale model

CONVERSION FACTORS--BRITISH TO METRIC UNITS OF MEASUREMENT

The following conversion factors adopted by the Bureau of Reclamation are those published by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Metric Practice Guide, January 1964 except that additional factors (*) commonly used in the Bureau have been added. Further discussion of definitions of quantities and units is given on pages 10-11 of the ASTM Metric Practice Guide.

The metric units and conversion factors adopted by the ASTM are based on the "International System of Units" designated CGS or Système International d'Unités, used by the International Committee for Weights and Measures; this system is also known as the SI or MEGA (meter-kilogram-ampere-second) system. This system has been adopted by the International Organization for Standardization in ISO Recommendation R-31.

The metric technical unit of force is the kilogram-force; this is the force which, when applied to a body having a mass of 1 kg, gives it an acceleration of 9.8066 m/sec/sec. The standard acceleration of free fall toward the earth's center for sea level at 45 deg latitude. The metric unit of force in SI units is the newton (N), which is defined as that force which, when applied to a body having a mass of 1 kg, gives it an acceleration of 1 m/sec/sec. These units must be distinguished from the (nonmetric) local weight of a body having a mass of 1 kg, that is, the weight of a body in the force with which a body is attracted to the earth and is equal to the mass of a body multiplied by the acceleration due to gravity. However, because it is general practice to use "pounds" rather than the technically correct term "kilogram-force," the term "kilogram" (as derived mass unit) has been used in the past instead of "kilogram-force" to express the conversion factors for forces. The metric unit of force will thus increasing use, and is essential to SI units.

Table I
QUANTITIES AND UNITS OF SPACE

Metric	Br.	To obtain
LENGTH		
Miles	1.609344 (exactly)	Meters
Inches	25.4 (exactly)	Millimeters
Feet	30.48 (exactly)*	Centimeters
Yards	0.3048 (exactly)	Meters
Miles (statute)	1,000,344 (exactly)*	Kilometers
	1,000,344 (exactly)	Meters
	1,000,344 (exactly)	Kilometers
AREA		
Square inches	6,4516 (exactly)	Square centimeters
Square foot	0.092903 (exactly)	Square meters
Square yards	0.836128 (exactly)	Square meters
Acres	4,047 (exactly)	Hectares
Square miles	2,589,932 (exactly)	Square meters
	2,589,932 (exactly)	Square kilometers
VOLUME		
Cubic inches	16.3871 (exactly)	Cubic centimeters
Cubic feet	0.0283168 (exactly)	Cubic meters
Cubic yards	0.764552 (exactly)	Cubic meters
CAPACITY		
Fluid ounces (U.S.)	29.5735 (exactly)	Cubic centimeters
Liquid pints (U.S.)	59.1470 (exactly)	Milliliters
Quarts (U.S.)	118.2940 (exactly)	Cubic decimeters
Gallons (U.S.)	236.5880 (exactly)	Liters
Gallons (U.K.)	2,769.43 (exactly)	Cubic centimeters
	73,860 (exactly)	Liters
	798.33 (exactly)	Cubic decimeters
	0.079833 (exactly)	Liters
Cubic feet	4,54602 (exactly)	Cubic meters
Cubic yards	28,2160 (exactly)	Cubic decimeters
Acres-feet	394.56 (exactly)	Liters
	1,233.5 (exactly)	Cubic meters
	1,233.5 (exactly)	Liters

ABSTRACT

Studies using a 1:100 scale model of Bartlett Dam illustrate that erosion along the discharge channel was caused by flow diversion. Remedial work performed thus far has been beneficial, but additional paving protection and concrete fill should be installed along the left bank and at the base of the steep slope. These channel protection measures will prevent undermining the concrete-lined chute for all discharges up to the design flow of 175,000 cfs (6,952.5 cms). At flows of about 50,000 cfs (1,415 cms) or more, erosion is expected in the discharge channel remote from the concrete-lined chute. Excavation of protruding ridges to straighten the channel would do more harm than good. The studies proved that all 3 gates could be opened for best flow distribution at the right bank.

ABSTRACT

Studies using a 1:100 scale model of Bartlett Dam illustrate that erosion along the discharge channel was caused by impact of the spillway flow. Remedial work performed thus far has been beneficial, but additional paving protection and concrete fill should be installed along the left bank and at the base of the steep slope. These channel protection measures will prevent undermining the concrete-lined chute for all discharges up to the design flow of 175,000 cfs (6,952.5 cms). At flows of about 50,000 cfs (1,415 cms) or more, erosion is expected in the discharge channel remote from the concrete-lined chute. Excavation of protruding ridges to straighten the channel would do more harm than good. The studies proved that all 3 gates should be opened for best flow distribution at the right bank.

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Denver, 20 p., 14 figs., 3 tab

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